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Abstract. 
Ontological arguments like those of Gödel (1995) and Pruss (2009; 2012) rely on premises 
that initially seem plausible, but on closer scrutiny are not.  The premises have modal import 
that is required for the arguments but is not immediately grasped on inspection, and which 
ultimately undermines the simpler logical intuitions that make the premises seem plausible.  
Furthermore, the notion of necessity that they involve goes unspecified, and yet must go 
beyond standard varieties of logical necessity.  This leaves us little reason to believe the 





Gödel (1995) introduced a new class of formal arguments for the existence of God, 
appealing to a notion of “positive” property and applying modal logic.  Gödel’s premises 
were later shown to imply modal collapse, i.e., if they are true, then everything true is 
necessary (Sobel 1987), and then to be inconsistent (Benzmuller and Paleo 2016).  However, 
Anderson (1990) and Pruss (2009; 2012) give simpler versions that avoid these problems.   
We will focus here on one of Pruss’s formulations, but our observations apply 
generally.  We will see that Pruss’s premises are not as innocent as they first appear.  Once 
their modal import is unpacked, and their unclear foundations exposed, they are not very 
plausible at all.  
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Pruss (2009) proposes the following axioms: 
 
F1:  If A is positive, then ~A is not positive. 
F2:  If A is positive and A entails B, then B is positive. 
N1:  Necessary existence (NE) is positive. 
N2:  Essential omnipotence (EO), essential omniscience, and essential perfect 
goodness are each positive. 
 
He argues from F1 and F2 that any two positive properties are “compossible”, i.e., it is 
possible something exists that has both properties.  Thus, it is possible that something 
necessarily exists and is essentially omnipotent, and applying the axioms of S5, he deduces 
that something does necessarily exists and is essentially omnipotent.  (For simplicity we will 
only discuss omnipotence here; the treatment of omniscience and goodness is entirely 
parallel.  Also, we will not take issue with the axioms of S5.) 
Pruss suggests several possible meanings for ‘positive,’ and we will consider a few of 
them below, but in fact, it does not matter much what ‘positive’ means.  As long as we can 
find some class of properties that satisfies Pruss’s axioms, the derivation goes through.  One 
such class might consist of just NE, EO, and all the properties they imply.  If these do not 
include two contradictory properties A and ~A, Pruss’s axioms are satisfied. 
This ought to be worrying.  It seems all too easy to concoct a notion of positivity that 
will entail the existence of God, or for that matter, of anything, provided it is consistent with 
NE.  And it seems that nearly any property would be consistent with NE.  No standard system 
of logic rules out any possible being existing necessarily.  Thus we can help ourselves to all 
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manner of parody arguments.  If NE is consistent with being essentially a nine-legged frog 
(E9LF), then take all the properties implied by NE or E9LF, call them positive, and voilá, 
there necessarily exists a nine-legged frog.  But surely the existence of a nine-legged frog 
would be an accident, so something has gone wrong. 
 Our mistake was to suppose that NE and E9LF were really consistent in the relevant 
sense.  If we consider carefully what NE, ‘essentially’, and ‘compossible’ mean in this 
context, we will see that this is not plausible.   
What is NE?  Pruss gives an elaborate formulation: 
 
D1:  x necessarily exists if and only if $F[£Fx & £$yFy & £"y(Fy ® y = x)]. 
 
All we need to note here is that, for any x, NEx is equivalent to £NEx.  Pruss argues that 
NEx implies £NEx (2009, 352), and the converse is trivial.  Let us say that a property is 
necessitated if it can be expressed in the form £φ(x).  So NE is a necessitated property.   
The property of essentially having a property A is also a necessitated property.  Pruss 
never defines ‘essential,’ but its meaning is clear from his argument (2009, 352):  x has A 
essentially if and only if x has A in every accessible possible world where x exists, i.e.,  
£(x exists ® Ax).  (Logicians differ on how to formulate ‘exists’ in this context, but that 
need not concern us here.)  So essential properties are necessitated too, including EO and 
E9LF. 
Necessitated properties are not simple, atomic properties that might or might not hold 
of anything.  In S5, ¯£Ax implies £Ax, so it is not possible that a thing necessarily has A 
unless it does necessarily have A.  It follows from this and Pruss’s Lemma 4 (2009) that 
¯$x(NEx & E9LFx) can only hold if £$x(NEx & E9LFx) does.  In other words, necessary 
existence and being essentially a nine-legged frog are not compossible unless something 
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actually has both those properties necessarily.  But Pruss argues that if two properties are not 
compossible, then one entails the negation of the other.  So unless something really does have 
NE and E9LF, and has them necessarily, NE and E9LF are not consistent in the relevant 
sense.  Intuitively they seem consistent, and indeed no standard system of logic tells us that 
they are contradictory, but they are not consistent in the sense we need unless they are 
necessarily co-instantiated, and that is quite implausible.  There clearly does not have to be 
nine-legged frog.  Thus the assumption that NE and E9LF could be contained in a class of 
properties satisfying Pruss’s axioms is not nearly as plausible as it first seemed.  We judged it 
plausible without attending to its full modal import in the context of S5.   
Now, Pruss does not merely assume that NE and EO are consistent.  He supposes his 
axioms are plausible and derives the result that NE and EO are compossible, and then that 
they are co-instantiated.  However, I claim that he makes essentially the same mistake as we 
have with our nine-legged frog by supposing the axioms are plausible.  The first clue that 
they are not plausible is that they imply a very strong, physically significant, intuitively 
contingent proposition, namely that an omnipotent being exists.  But rather than rely on the 
implausibility of the conclusion, let us scrutinize the axioms, especially F2. 
What is the sense of ‘entails’ in F2?  Pruss writes, “If we assume toward contradiction 
that A and B are incompossible, then A entails ~B” (2009, 349).  So the sense of ‘entails’ 
must be one that is implied by incompossibility.  The strongest entailment implied by 
~¯$x(Ax & Bx) is £"x(Ax ® ~Bx).  Thus his ‘entails’ is no stronger than necessitated 
universal material implication.  This is weaker than logical entailment, for the necessity 
involved cannot be necessity in virtue of any standard system of logic.  After all, the 
existence of an essentially omnipotent being is not a truth of any such system.  In other 
words, Pruss’s ‘£’ represents some unspecified notion of necessity, presumably 
metaphysical, that is not equivalent to validity in any standard system of logic.  Put yet 
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another way, ‘£’ represents truth in all “possible worlds” within some intended model or 
range of models rather than truth in all possible worlds in all models permitted by some 
standard semantics.  Hence Pruss’s ‘A entails B’ just means that, in every intended possible 
world, everything that has A has B.  
 
£ ¯ £ 
 
Given that, and assuming that positivity satisfies F1 and F2, is it plausible that NE and 
EO are positive?  I say no.   
One sense of ‘positive’ that Pruss mentions is, entailing no detraction or limitation.  It 
might seem plausible at first that NE and EO are positive in this sense, and if so, it follows 
that everything they entail is positive.  But if in fact there is no intended possible world where 
something has both NE and EO, then NE does “entail” some limitation or detraction, namely 
~EO, and EO “entails” the limitation or detraction ~NE.  And we have no reason to suppose 
that NE and EO are co-instantiated in any of the intended worlds, especially since we are 
given no hint what possible worlds are intended.  So, though it was not initially apparent how 
NE or EO could entail anything negative, we can now see that the relevant kind of entailment 
is actually quite easy to come by.  All it requires is that not every intended possible world 
contains an omnipotent being, and we have no independent reason to think every intended 
world does contain one.  So we have no reason to believe that neither NE nor EO entails any 
detraction or limitation. 
What about the Leibnizian sense of ‘positive’?  Gödel (1995) hints at such an 
interpretation, suggesting that ‘positive’ might mean pure “attribution” in the sense that the 
disjunctive normal form of the property contains at least one disjunct without negation.  Two 
such properties cannot be logically contradictory if the elementary properties are all possible 
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and independent.  If NE and EO are positive in this sense, then we can skip Pruss’s axioms 
and infer compossibility directly, which leads quickly to the theistic conclusion.  But as 
Adams points out in his introduction to Gödel 1995, this approach depends on “the 
controversial assumption that the only way in which properties can be incompatible is by 
formal contradiction arising from negation involved in their construction” (1995, 398).  
Given the modal demands of Gödelian arguments, this is not just a controversial assumption 
but flatly false.  As we saw, two necessitated properties are contradictory if they are not 
actually co-instantiated, and this is not due to negation in their construction, but to their 
necessity operators.  Nor can those operators be reduced to disjunctions and negations, for as 
noted, the necessity involved cannot be merely logical necessity. 
 
¯ £ ¯ 
 
The positivity and consistency of NE and EO seems plausible before we unpack (even 
in broad stokes, as we did here) the modal content of positivity, consistency, NE, and EO.  
Once we attend to that modal content, though, the plausibility collapses.   
It might be tempting to view this as merely another case of, “One person’s modus 
ponens is another’s modus tollens,” but there is more going on here.  First, the premises 
appear plausible because we initially misconstrue them in simple logical terms, but in fact 
they pack modal import that makes them much less plausible.  Second, judging the 
plausibility of the premises requires us to evaluate modal claims founded on an unspecified 
notion of necessity, which must go beyond standard theories of logical necessity, but for 
which we have been given no basis of evaluation.   
Pruss is wise to say that his argument is not a proof of God’s existence and merely 
confers some incremental credibility on the conclusion (2009, 352).  But given that the 
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apparent plausibility of the axioms dissipates once we attend to their actual content, it is 
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